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Abstract
We present several quantum public-key encryption (QPKE) protocols de-
signed with conjugate coding single-photon string, thus may be realized in
laboratory with nowadays techniques. Two of these schemes are orienting
one-bit message, and are extended to two kinds of QPKE schemes ori-
enting multi-bits. The novel structure of these protocols ensures they are
information-theoretically secure with, probably, a bound greater than any
given polynomial of n. Finally, we describe a way to conceal the classical
part of the public key with quantum state, this idea is expected to enhance
a scheme to be information-theoretically secure.
Keywords: quantum cryptography, quantum public-key encryption,
information-theoretic security
1. Introduction
Public-key encryption was first proposed in 1976 [1, 2], which makes the
two parties can do secret communication without presharing a secret key.
Up till now, the security of a public-key cryptography scheme is based on
a mathematically difficult problem, though whose difficulty has not been
proved. In a quantum computation environment, most of these problems
will be no more difficult [3], then the related public-key protocols will not be
secure.
Then we need to find new public-key schemes to resist the attacks of
quantum adversaries. One solution is private-key protocols with the aid of
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quantum key distribution (QKD). Many schemes of QKD have been proposed
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Another solution is to construct quantum public-key encryption
(QPKE). Okamoto et al. [9] introduce a public-key encryption scheme with
a quantum algorithm in key generation phase. Gottesman [10] is the first
to put forward a protocol named “quantum public key cryptography with
information-theoretic security”. Yang et al. [11, 12] present some public-key
encryption protocols based on induced trap-door one-way transformation.
Kawachi et al. present a QPKE scheme of based on “computational indis-
tinguishability” of two quantum states [13, 14] related with automorphism
group of graphs problem. Nikolopoulos presents a QPKE scheme [15, 16]
based on single-qubit rotations.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe some basic
definitions of information-theoretic security, one-way function and hash func-
tions. In Section 3, we present two public-key encryptions orienting one-bit
message based on conjugate coding. In section 4, we extend the schemes to
those orienting multi-bits. In section 5, we describe a way to conceal the
classical part of the public key with quantum state, this idea is expected
to enhance a scheme to be information-theoretically secure. In section 6, we
discuss a public-key encryption scheme based on a special entanglement state
we presented in [19].
2. Preliminary
2.1. Information-theoretic security
The ciphertext-indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-
CPA) [17] can be understand as that while the adversary chooses two plain-
texts and is then given one of the corresponding ciphertexts, the adversary
cannot yet determine which plaintext corresponds to the previously unseen
ciphertext he received.
Strictly speaking, the concept information-theoretic IND-CPA is defined
as [18]: for every circuit family {Cn}, every positive polynomial p(·), all
sufficiently large n, and every x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗, the probability Pr(·) satisfies:
|Pr[Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(y)) = 1]| <
1
p(n)
. (1)
In the case of QPKE, the information-theoretic quantum IND-CPA is defined
as [19]:
Definition 1. A quantum public-key encryption scheme is information
-theoretically ciphertext-indistinguishable under quantum CPA if for every
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quantum circuit family {Cn}, every positive polynomial p(·), all sufficiently
large n, and every bit-string x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗, the probability Pr(·) satisfies:
|Pr[Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(y)) = 1]| <
1
p(n)
, (2)
where the algorithm E is a quantum encryption algorithm, and the ciphertext
E(x), E(y) are quantum states.
It is proved [20] that if the trace distance between any two ciphertexts is
O( 1
2n
), Eq. (2) will hold, and the quantum public-key encryption scheme will
be information-theoretically secure.
The term “bounded information-theoretically secure” means that the bit
number of plaintext encrypted with information-theoretic security has an
upper bound. In [14], this bound of the protocol is proven to be the bit
number of private key [21], thus it is much less than that of a practical
protocol.
2.2. One-way function
A trapdoor one-way function is necessary in a public-key encryption pro-
tocol. A one-way function(OWF)based on classical computational complex-
ity hypothesis [17] is a function f such that for each x in the domain of f ,
it is easy to compute f(x); but for essentially all y in the range of f , it is
infeasible to find any x such that y = f(x) in expected polynomial time, i.e.
Pr[A(f(Un), 1
n) ∈ f−1(f(Un))] < 1
p(n)
. (3)
A trapdoor one-way function [17] is a one-way function f with the additional
property that if some extra information (called the trapdoor information) is
given, it will becomes feasible to find an x in the domain of f , for any given
y in the range of f , such that f(x) = y.
The one-way property of classical OWF is usually in the sense of com-
putational security, i.e., it is based on a hypothesis of the adversary’s power
of computation. The quantum one-way transformation(OWT) we suggest
here is in the sense of information-theoretic security, since it is based on the
property of quantum states: people with the correct basis can get the exact
bits contained in the states, but one without the information of basis cannot
get them with an in-negligible probability.
3
2.3. Hash functions and randomness
In our schemes below, a multi-output Boolean function F : {0, 1}m →
{0, 1}n(m > n) is used as the private key. Since m > n, F can also be taken
as a Hash function. Suppose X is the set of all messages (input), and Y is
the set of all message digests (output) with |Y | = M . The theorem in [22]
ensures the randomness of the function’s output:
Theorem 1. Suppose Hash function h is randomly selected, let X0 ⊆ X.
Suppose that if and only if x ∈ X0, h(x) is determined (through querying
the oracle). Then for all x ∈ X/X0 and y ∈ Y , there is always the relation
Pr[h(x) = y] = 1/M .
3. Quantum public-key encryption schemes for one-bit message
Let k = (k1, · · · , kn) be a n-bit string, where k1, · · · , kn ∈ {0, 1} . For the
Hadamard transform H = 1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
, we defineHk = H
k1⊗· · ·⊗Hkn, where
H0 is the unit operator I, and H1 is H . Similarly for the Pauli operator Y =[
0 −i
i 0
]
, we define Yk = Y k1⊗· · ·⊗Y kn . Let Ωb = {i ∈ {0, 1}n|i1⊕· · ·⊕in = b},
here b = 0, 1.
3.1. First scheme
In this scheme, the OWT is a transformation mapping the classical mes-
sage b to an unknown state
ρb =
∑
P (j)=b
Yj

∑
F
HF (s)

 ∑
P (i)=0
piF |i〉〈i|

HF (s)

Yj .
The trapdoor information is the basis string k = F (s) on which the quantum
states are encoded. The private key is a Boolean function F . Using s, the
classical part of the public-key, the private-key owner can get the trapdoor
information k by k = F (s). The scheme is shown as follows:
[Key Generation] During this phase, Bob can do as follows:
(G1) Select randomly a multi-output Boolean function F : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n
as his private key;
(G2) Select randomly s ∈ {0, 1}m, and computes k = F (s);
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(G3) Generate |i〉 with i ∈ Ω0;
(G4) Apply Hk to |i〉, and take the classical-quantum pair (s,Hk|i〉) as one
of his public-keys.
[Encryption] If Alice wants to send one bit message b to Bob, she should
get one of Bob’s public keys, and then:
(E1) Select j randomly from Ωb;
(E2) Alice applies Yj to Hk|i〉, and then sends (s, YjHk|i〉) to Bob.
[Decryption] After receiving the ciphertext, Bob should:
(D1) Calculate k = F (s);
(D2) Apply Hk to YjHk|i〉, and measure it in the basis {|0〉, |1〉}n.
Here F can be generated efficiently. Each output of the Boolean function
F can be written as
F i(s) =
⊕
d1,··· ,dm
αid1,··· ,dms
d1
1 · · · sdmm , (4)
where i = 1, · · · , n. There are 2m terms to add up in each F i(s), but after
m times of coin tossing, we can determined a sd11 · · · sdmm by one instance of
d1, · · · , dm. We let the corresponding αid1,··· ,dm = 1, then one component is
determined. If we toss the coin for m · O(m) times, O(m) components are
determined. We then let other component coefficients to be zero. Thus F
can be efficiently generated by n ·m · O(m). This algorithm produces many
strings of m random bits, and the number of the strings is polynomial in m.
Bob generates a large amount of public-keys with a private key F . In
each of these public-keys, s is different. The classical string s is bounded to
the quantum state Hk|i〉 as a label.
The public key state for the adversary is
∑
F σF,s, here
σF,s = HF (s)

 ∑
P (i)=0
piF |i〉〈i|

HF (s). (5)
The ciphertext state for the adversary is
s,∑
j
Yj

∑
F
HF (s)

 ∑
P (i)=0
pijF |i〉〈i|

HF (s)

Yj

 , (6)
5
and the quantum part of the ciphertext for a selected j is
ρj = Yj

∑
F
HF (s)

 ∑
P (i)=0
piF |i〉〈i|

HF (s)

Yj. (7)
While Bob gets the one-bit message from the parity of bit string he re-
ceived. The state after applying Hk to YjHk|i〉 is
HkYjHk|i〉 = (−1)k·jYj|i〉 = (−1)j·(i⊕k)+ 12WH (j)|i⊕ j〉. (8)
Thus, after measuring it, Bob gets |i⊕j〉, here ⊕ is bit-wise addition modulo
2. The parity of WH(j) is equal to the parity of WH(i ⊕ j), because WH(i)
is even. Then the message (plaintext) is obtained.
3.2. Security analysis
The adversary has two ways to attack the QPKE scheme. One is to
attack plaintext via distinguishing the two ciphertexts; another is to attack
the private key F via getting information of k.
For the first way of attack, we now prove that the trace distance between
the two different ciphertexts is O( 1
2n
).
The quantum part of public key Hk|i〉 is a state consisting of n qubits from
the set {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}, and the total number of |1〉 and |−〉 is even. After
encrypted by Alice, the state is also n qubits from the set {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}.
If the message is 0, the number of 1 in j is even, then the number of qubits
operated by Y is even. If the number of Y on |1〉 and |−〉 is odd, then the
number of Y on |0〉 and |+〉 (which producing |1〉 and |−〉) is odd. Remember
that the |1〉 and |−〉 which are unchanged is odd, then after encrypted by
Alice, the total number of |1〉 and |−〉 will be even. Given s which is randomly
selected, because of the way F is generated, the randomness of k can be
ensured. The analysis when the message is 1 is similar. Then we can write
the states of ciphertext when the message is b to be:
ρb =
1
22n−1
∑
P (i)=b,j
|ψi1j1〉〈ψi1j1| · · · |ψinjn〉〈ψinjn|, (9)
where |ψij〉 ≡ HjX i|0〉.
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Now we calculate the trace distance between ρ0 and ρ1 using the method
in [23]. Define two trace-preserving quantum operations E1 and E2, for any
n-bit quantum state ρ
E1(ρ) = U⊗npi
4
ρU⊗npi
4
†
, (10)
and
E2(ρ) = 1
2n
∑
k∈{0,1}n
HkρH
†
k. (11)
Here U pi
4
= e−i
pi
4
Y =
√
2
2
[
1 −1
1 1
]
, which rotates each qubit of ρ around y axis
by an angle of pi/2:
Upi
4
|0〉 → |+〉,
Upi
4
|1〉 → −|−〉,
Upi
4
|+〉 → |1〉, (12)
Upi
4
|−〉 → |0〉.
Define
σ0 =
1
2n−1
∑
P (j)=0
|φj1〉〈φj1| · · · |φjn〉〈φjn|, (13)
where |φj〉 = Hj |0〉.
We can see
E2 ◦ E1(σ0)
= E2(U⊗npi
4
σ0U
⊗n
pi
4
†
)
=
1
2n
∑
k
Hk(U
⊗n
pi
4
σ0U
⊗n
pi
4
†
)H†k. (14)
Because
H iUpi
4
|0〉 =
{ |+〉 (i = 0)
|0〉 (i = 1)
H iUpi
4
|+〉 =
{ |1〉 (i = 0)
|−〉 (i = 1)
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then
E2 ◦ E1(σ0)
=
1
22n−1
∑
P (i)=0,j
|ψi1j1〉〈ψi1j1| · · · |ψinjn〉〈ψinjn|. (15)
That means
E2 ◦ E1(σ0) = ρ0. (16)
And similarly we define
σ1 =
1
2n−1
∑
P (j)=1
|φj1〉〈φj1| · · · |φjn〉〈φjn|. (17)
We can get
E2 ◦ E1(σ1) = ρ1. (18)
As trace-preserving quantum operations are contractive [24], we get
D(ρ0, ρ1) ≤ D(σ0, σ1). (19)
D(σ0, σ1) is easy to compute. By Mathematical induction, we have
σ0 − σ1 = 1
2n−1
(|0〉〈0| − |+〉〈+|)⊗n
=
1
2n−1
[
1
2
−1
2
−1
2
−1
2
]⊗n
. (20)
Then
D(σ0, σ1) =
1
2
· tr |σ0 − σ1|
=
1
2n
tr
∣∣∣∣∣
[
1
2
−1
2
−1
2
−1
2
]⊗n∣∣∣∣∣ ,
here |A| is the singular value matrix of matrix A, |A| =
√
A†A. By spectral
decomposition, we have the following conclusion for normal matrices A1 and
A2:
tr|A1 ⊗ A2| = tr|A1| · tr|A2|, (21)
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we then have
D(σ0, σ1) =
1
2n
(
tr
∣∣∣∣
[
1
2
−1
2
−1
2
−1
2
]∣∣∣∣
)n
= (
√
2
2
)n. (22)
Finally
D(ρ0, ρ1) ≤ D(σ0, σ1) = (
√
2
2
)n. (23)
In order to against the second kind of attack, the scheme can be amended
as follow.
3.3. Second scheme
In the first scheme, half of i is impossible to appear, here we show a
enhance scheme that ensures i’s randomness.
[Key generation] During key generation phase, Bob generates his private
and public keys, he can do as follows:
(G1) Generate randomly a multi-output Boolean function F = (F1, F2) as
his private key, here F1 : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n and F2 : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}
is a balanced Boolean function;
(G2) Select randomly |i〉 ∈ {0, 1}n. Then select s ∈ {0, 1}m randomly, and
compute k = F1(s), p = F2(s). If p 6= P (i), Bob selects s again until
p = P (i);
(G3) Apply Hk to |i〉, and take (s,Hk|i〉) as one of his public-key.
[Encryption] If Alice wants to send one bit message b to Bob, she should
get one of Bob’s public keys, and then:
(E1) Select j randomly from Ωb;
(E2) Alice applies Yj to Hk|i〉, and then sends (s, YjHk|i〉) to Bob.
[Decryption] After Bob receives (s, YjHk|i〉) sent by Alice, he should:
(D1) Calculate (k, P (i)) = F (s);
(D2) Apply Hk to YjHk|i〉, and measures it in the basis {|0〉, |1〉}n.
9
F can be generated efficiently by the similar local coin tossing algorithm
in 3.1. In addition, to ensure the randomness of i, the set F made of F2
should satisfy that: for any f ∈ F , f + 1 ∈ F . To achieve this property,
we only need to add one extra coin tossing for determining whether add an
extra “1” to F2. Furthermore, for a fixed s, the probability of i distributes
evenly to the adversary.
Let P(i) = P (i) is the parity bit of i. The state after applying Hk to
YjHk|i〉 is (−1)j·(i⊕k)+WH(j)/2|i ⊕ j〉. Thus, after measuring HkYjHk|i〉, Bob
gets |i⊕j〉. If P(i) = 0, the parity ofWH(j) is equal to the parity ofWH(i⊕j);
if P(i) = 1, the parity of WH(j) is opposite to the parity of WH(i⊕ j). Then
the message (0 or 1) is obtained from the parity of WH(j).
3.4. Security analysis
For the attack to plaintext, the adversary cannot get any information of
it from the ciphertext. Let the ciphertexts for a fixed s and b is ρb(s), first
we divide F into two part: F0s and F1s , they satisfy that
F0s = {f ∈ F|f(s) = 0},
and
F1s = {f ∈ F|f(s) = 1}. (24)
Then we get |F0s | = |F1s | = |F|2 , and
ρb =
∑
P (j)=b
pjYj
[∑
F1,F2
∑
i
pF1pipF2|iHF1(s)|i〉〈i|HF1(s)
]
Yj. (25)
Here pj =
1
2n−1
, pF1 =
1
|{F1}|
, pi =
1
2n
and pF2|i is conditional probability of F2
while i and s is fixed,
pF2|i =
{
0 (F2 ∈ F bs)
2
|F|
(F2 ∈ F b¯s ). (26)
Thus we have:
∑
F2
pF2|i = 1 and
ρb =
∑
P (j)=b
pjYj
∑
F1
∑
i
[
pF1piHF1(s)|i〉〈i|HF1(s)
∑
F2
pF2|i
]
Yj =
I
2n
, (27)
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so
D(ρ0, ρ1) = 0. (28)
Denote
ρF,s,b =
∑
P (j)=b
∑
i
pjpi|F2Yj
[
HF1(s) (|i〉〈i|)HF1(s)
]
Yj,
pi|F2 =
{
0 (P (i) 6= F2(s))
1
2n−1
(P (i) = F2(s)).
(29)
when this scheme is used to encrypt t bits, the ciphertext for the bit-string
can be written as ∑
F
(ρF,s1,b1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρF,st,bt) . (30)
Thus the security is depend on this trace distance:
D
(∑
F
(ρF,s1,b1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρF,st,bt) ,
∑
F
(
ρF,s1,b′1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρF,st,b′t
))
. (31)
Even the Eq. 28 hold, this does not mean the scheme is information-
theoretic secure for one-bit oriented encryption. In practical attack, the ad-
versary may own some public keys as extra information, the density operator
of public key is:
∑
F τF,s, here
τF,s = HF1(s)
∑
i
(pi|F2|i〉〈i|)HF1(s). (32)
so the trace distance for different one-bit ciphertexts is:
D
(∑
F
(ρF,s0,0 ⊗ τF,s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ τF,st),
∑
F
(ρF,s0,1 ⊗ τF,s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ τF,st)
)
. (33)
The trace distance for different m-bits string ciphertexts should be
D
(∑
F
(ρF,~s,~b ⊗ τF,~s′),
∑
F
(ρF,~s,~b′ ⊗ τF,~s′)
)
, (34)
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where
ρF,~s,~b = ρF,s1,b1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρF,st,bt , (35)
τF,~s′ = τF,s′1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ τF,s′t. (36)
Thus if we want to prove the scheme is information-theoretic secure, it
follows that Eqs. (33)(34) are exponential small according to [20].
3.5. Discussion on quantum OWT
To do the OWT from message b to state Eb(ρ(n)0 (F (s), i)), one usually
does unitary operation depending on b on the public key ρ(n)0 (F (s), i), then
discard the extra outputs and get Em(ρ(n)0 (F (s), i)). One cannot obtain the
original state without the extra outputs. If one has done many operations
on ρ
(n)
0 (F (s), i), he cannot get the original state even with the extra outputs,
because he does not know the corresponding state of extra outputs for the
certain operation.
Consider the unitary transformation Uf(|x〉|y〉) = |x〉|y⊕f(x)〉. |x〉 is the
input qubit, and |y〉 is auxiliary qubit. For the initial state ∑xi αxi|xi〉|0〉,
the output is
Uf (
∑
xi
αxi|xi〉|0〉) =
∑
xi
αxi |xi〉|f(xi)〉. (37)
People with trapdoor information |xi〉 can do the following operation
Uf−1 |xi〉|f(xi)〉 = |0〉|f(xi)〉. (38)
For people without trapdoor information |xi〉, he can only do as
Uf(|xi〉|f(xj)〉) = |xi〉|f(xj)⊕ f(xi)〉. (39)
If dH(f(xi), f(xj)) = 0, |f(xj) ⊕ f(xi)〉 = |0〉, then the input for f(xj) is
obtained, here dH is the Hamming distance. Consider the probability when
dH(f(xi), f(xj)) = 0 is valid. For a given f(xj), the probability is (
1
2
)n. Then
according to Eq. (3), it is a one-way transformation.
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4. Extend to multi-bit-oriented schemes
The scheme in Sec. 3 is one-bit-oriented. We now extend it to multi-bit-
oriented schemes. In the following scheme of multi-bit message, the OWT is
to map the classical message j to an unknown state
ρj = Yj
[∑
F
HF (s)
(∑
i
piF |i〉〈i|
)
HF (s)
]
Yj.
The trapdoor information is the basis k = F (s) on which the quantum states
are encoded. The private key is a Boolean function F . Using a part of the
public-key s, the owner of private-key can get the trapdoor information k by
k = F (s).
4.1. First scheme
[Key generation] During this phase, Bob can do as follows:
(G1) Select randomly a multi-output Boolean function F : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n
as his private key;
(G2) Select randomly s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}m, and compute k = F (s1), i = F (s2);
(G3) Apply Hk to |i〉, and take (s1, s2, Hk|i〉) as his public key.
[Encryption] If Alice wants to send n-bit message j to Bob, she should get
one of Bob’s public keys, and then:
(E1) Apply Yj to Hk|i〉, and then sends (s1, s2, YjHk|i〉) to Bob.
[Decryption] After Bob receives |ψs1〉 ⊗ |ψs2〉 ⊗ YjHk|i〉 sent by Alice, he
should:
(D1) Calculate k = F (s1), i = F (s2);
(D2) Apply Hk to YjHk|i〉, and measure on the basis {|0〉, |1〉}n.
4.2. Second scheme
[Key generation]
(G1) Select randomly two multi-output Boolean function F1 : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n, F2 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n as his private key;
(G2) Select randomly s ∈ {0, 1}m, and compute k = F1(s), i = F2(s);
(G3) Apply Hk to |i〉, and and take (s,Hk|i〉) as his one public-key.
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[Encryption] If Alice wants to send n-bit message j to Bob, she should get
one of Bob’s public keys, and then:
(E1) Apply Yj to Hk|i〉, and then sends (s, YjHk|i〉) to Bob.
[Decryption] After Bob receives (s, YjHk|i〉) sent by Alice, he should:
(D1) Calculate k = F1(s), i = F2(s);
(D2) Apply Hk to YjHk|i〉, and measure on the basis {|0〉, |1〉}n.
4.3. Security analysis for both schemes
In the two multi-bit-oriented schemes described above, Bob can get the
message via measuring the result. The state after applying Hk to YjHk|i〉 is
(−1)j·(i⊕k)+WH(j)/2|i⊕ j〉, thus, after measuring HkYjHk|i〉, Bob gets |i⊕ j〉.
Because Bob can get the exact value of i, he can get the message j finally.
The adversary has also two ways to attack these two schemes. One is
to attack the private key via getting information of k; another is to at-
tack plaintext via distinguishing the two ciphertexts. For the first method,
similar to the analysis in Sec. 3.4, Hk|i〉 for k and k′ (k 6= k′) are ρk =
1
2n
∑
i∈{0,1}n Hk|i〉〈i|H†k and ρk′ = 12n
∑
i∈{0,1}n Hk′|i〉〈i|H†k′, respectively. We
can get ρk = ρk′ = I/2
n, then D(E(ρk), E(ρk′)) ≤ D(ρk, ρk′) = 0. Thus no
quantum algorithm can distinguish the two quantum states ρk and ρk′, the
two states are indistinguishable.
For the second way, we can prove that the adversary cannot get any
information of the plaintext from the ciphertext. Let the message be j, the
ciphertext is
ρj = Yj
[∑
F
HF (s)
(∑
i
piF |i〉〈i|
)
HF (s)
]
Yj = I/2
n. (40)
Then for any j and j′(j 6= j′), D(ρj , ρj′) = 0. Thus D(E(ρj), E(ρj′)) ≤
D(ρj, ρj′) = 0. No quantum algorithm can distinguish the two ciphertext.
According to [20], this scheme is information-theoretic secure.
5. Enhanced scheme
In the schemes given above, though Hk|i〉 is unknown to the adversary,
he can point out whether each private key is different since s is obvious, so
it generally requires that the same public-key should not be reused. Here
we show a method to solve this problem, enhance the scheme in Sec. 3.3 for
example:
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[Key generation] During key generation phase, Bob generates his private
and public keys, he can do as follows:
(G1) Generate a multi-output Boolean function F : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n+1
randomly, then select randomly l ∈ {0, 1}m. Take (F, l) as his private
key;
(G2) Select randomly |i〉 ∈ {0, 1}n. Then select s ∈ {0, 1}m randomly, and
compute (k, p) = F (s). If p 6= P (i), Bob selects s again until p = P (i);
(G3) Calculate |ψs〉 = |s1〉l1 ⊗ |s2〉l2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |sm〉lm ;
(G4) Apply Hk to |i〉, and take |ψs〉 ⊗Hk|i〉 as his one public-key.
[Encryption] If Alice wants to send one bit message b to Bob, she should
get one of Bob’s public keys, and then:
(E1) Select j randomly from Ωb;
(E2) Alice applies I ⊗ Yj to |ψs〉 ⊗ Hk|i〉, and then sends |ψs〉 ⊗ YjHk|i〉 to
Bob.
[Decryption] After Bob receives |ψs〉 ⊗ YjHk|i〉 sent by Alice, he should:
(D1) Calculate from |ψs〉 and l to get s;
(D2) Calculate (k, P (i)) = F (s);
(D3) Apply Hk to YjHk|i〉, and measures it in the basis {|0〉, |1〉}n.
This method is also useful for our other schemes. It can be seen that, if
we use (s,Hk|i〉) as public key, for the same s, k is also the same for one-bit-
oriented schemes, and i is also the same for multi-bit-oriented schemes. Then
there may exist many copies of the same (s,Hk|i〉), the adversary may obtain
information of F with these copies. While we use |ψs〉 ⊗Hk|i〉 as the public
key, the adversary cannot get s directly, then he cannot get information of
F even as s are reused.
6. Public-key encryption scheme based on a special entanglement
state[19]
In [19] we present a public-key encryption scheme based on a special
entanglement state, we prove that the scheme is secure under the attack
to plaintext, since the ciphertexts encrypted from different plaintexts are
indistinguishable. Here we first complete the proof for Theorem 6 in [19],
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which is related to the attack to plaintext with ciphertext. Then we will give
a way to attack the private key by the public key.
Let Ωn = {k ∈ Z2n|WH(k) is odd} and Πn = {k ∈ Z2n|WH(k) is even},
where WH(k) is k’s Hamming weight. Let a Boolean Function F : Ωn → Ωn
be the private key. For a randomly chosen s, (s, ρ0k,i) is the public key satisfies
that k = F (s) and
ρ0k,i =
1
2
(|i〉+ |i⊕ k〉)(〈i|+ 〈i⊕ k|), (41)
as the same as that of [19].
Then the density operator of ciphertext for b = 0 is 1
2n−1
∑
k ρ
0
k for the
adversary:
ρ0k =
1
2 · 2n
∑
i
2(|i〉〈i|+ |i〉〈i⊕ k|) = 1
2n
∑
i
∑
x
|i〉〈i⊕ xk|, (42)
where x ∈ {0, 1}.
In order to analysis the attack to the plaintext, we should calculate the
trace distance between ciphertexts encrypted from different plaintexts:
‖ 1
2n−1
∑
k
((ρ0k − ρ1k)⊗ (ρ0k)⊗t−1) ‖tr,
here the first part of the summation (ρ0k−ρ1k) represent the difference between
ciphertexts, and the latter part (ρ0k)
⊗t represent the extra t − 1 public keys
that the adversary would own.
First we give the the trace distance between 1
2n−1
∑
k(ρ
0
k)
⊗t and ( I
2n
)⊗t:
‖ 1
2n−1
∑
k
(ρ0k)
⊗t − ( I
2n
)⊗t ‖tr
=
1
2n−12nt
‖
∑
k
∑
i
(
∑
x
|i〉〈i⊕ xk| − |i〉〈i|) ‖tr
=
1
2n−12nt
‖
∑
k
∑
i
∑
x 6=(0···0)
|i〉〈i⊕ xk| ‖tr . (43)
Let A =
∑
k
∑
i
∑
x 6=(0···0) |i〉〈i ⊕ xk|, it has a polar decomposition A =
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|A|V , then |tr(AV †)| = |tr|A|| = tr|A|, so the eq. (43) is equal to:
1
2n2nt
|tr(
∑
k
∑
i
∑
x 6=(0···0)
|i〉〈i⊕ xk|V †)|
=
1
2n2nt
|
∑
i
(
∑
k
∑
x 6=(0···0)
(〈i⊕ xk|)V †|i〉)|
≤ 1
2n2nt
∑
i
(‖ V †|i〉 ‖ · ‖
∑
k
∑
x 6=(0···0)
〈i⊕ xk| ‖)
≤ 1
2n2nt
· 2nt ·
√
2n−1(2t − 1) <
√
1
2n−t+1
. (44)
Similarly, we can get
‖ 1
2n−1
∑
k
(ρ1k ⊗ (ρ0k)⊗t−1 − (
I
2n
)⊗t) ‖tr<
√
1
2n−t+1
. (45)
Then we have
‖ 1
2n−1
∑
k
((ρ0k − ρ1k)⊗ (ρ0k)⊗t−1) ‖tr
≤ ‖ 1
2n−1
∑
k
(ρ1k ⊗ (ρ0k)⊗t−1 − (
I
2n
)⊗t) ‖tr + ‖ 1
2n−1
∑
k
(ρ0k)
⊗t − ( I
2n
)⊗t ‖tr
=
√
1
2n−t−1
. (46)
Thus the proof complete.
We will show a way to attack the private key by the public key. While
the attacker gets a public key (s, ρ0k,i), he can attack by taking a unitary
operation as follow:
Hn
1√
2
(|i〉+ |i⊕ k〉) = 1√
2n+1
∑
y
(
(−1)y·i|y〉+ (−1)y·(i⊕k)|y〉)
=
1√
2n+1
∑
y
(−1)y·i(1 + (−1)y·k)|y〉. (47)
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Then he measures the last state, if he gets a result called y0, it must
satisfy y0 · k = 0, thus he get a equation of F that:
F (S) · y0 = 0, (48)
which contains on bit information of F .
F is also built by n2 · p(n) variables:
F (s1, · · · , sn) = (F 1(s), · · · , F n(s)),
where
F j(s) = (s
aj11
1 · · · saj1nn )⊕ (saj211 · · · saj2nn )⊕ · · · ⊕ (s
ajp(n)1
1 · · · s
ajp(n)n
n ),
each ajkl = G(1) is a result of a toss. Since x
a = xa⊕ a⊕ 1, There is a linear
expression of F :
F j(s) =
p(n)⊕
α=1
(
n∏
β=1
(sβajαβ + ajαβ + 1)
)
. (49)
The scheme should be only called bounded information secure similar to the
scheme in [9, 21].
According to the schemes based on conjugate coding, it is secure under
the attack to the private key, since that the attack to the private key is
equivalent to the attack to the basis of an unknown state, we have already
proved that if this attack can be achieved it will lead to a Superluminal
communication[20].
7. Discussions
Every classical public-key scheme, such as RSA [1], is insecure under man-
in-the-middle (MIM) attack. If the adversary can intercept Bob’s public key
distribution channel, she can replace Bob’s public-key (n, e) with her own
public key (n′, e′), and send it to Alice. While Alice encrypts her message
with (n′, e′) and sends the ciphertext back to Bob, the adversary may decrypt
the ciphertext to get the message. Finally the adversary encrypts the message
with (n, e), and sends this ciphertext to Bob. We can see that nobody will
be aware of the exist of the adversary. It is clear that for the design of a
public-key encryption scheme, it is necessary to provide that Alice can obtain
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the public-key of Bob securely. Actually, this precondition is necessary for all
classical and quautum public-key encryption protocols. To resist the MIM
attack is the task of, such as public-key infrastructure (PKI).
A common feature of the scheme in [13] and our bit-oriented scheme is:
an n-qubit public key is needed to encrypt a one-bit message. The differ-
ence is, in the scheme of [13], for different messages, the public keys are the
same; however, in our schemes, the public keys are different for every time
of encryption, as a result of choosing different s and |i〉 at each time of key
generation. The security of our schemes is highly improved, while we can
see that the resources needed to store the quantum public keys are kept the
same.
In symmetric cryptography, one-time pad is information-theoretically se-
cure. In asymmetric cryptography, the schemes presented here can reach
bounded information-theoretic security, and the different keys used at dif-
ferent time are public keys rather than private keys. However, in classical
asymmetric cryptography, even if we use different public keys for every time
of encryption, information-theoretic security still cannot be reached. For ex-
ample, in the RSA scheme, if a different public key is used every new time of
encryption, the private key changes accordingly. Then only two ciphertexts
are needed to get the plaintext, and it is not secure.
8. Conclusion
We propose several QPKE schemes of classical messages based on conju-
gate coding, and prove that some of them are bounded information-theoretic
secure. We also discuss a scheme we presented in [19] based on the state
|i〉 + |i ⊕ k〉 and give a way to attack it. These schemes include scheme
present in [9] are all bounded information-theoretic secure, but the schemes
based on conjugate coding seem to be more secure than those in [9, 19] as
their public key’s reuse times is limit to the number of bits of the private key.
From a practical point of view, our schemes based on single-photon string
may be realized in near future.
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